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INTRODUCTION
Individuals engaged in clandestine intelligence collection are
constantly placed in peril. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
refers to such covert officers as case officers.1 The safety of case
officers and the integrity of their work are dependent upon secrecy,
especially with regard to their identities.2 Concealment of case
officers’ identities not only allows them to operate covertly, but their
confidence in the preservation of this information also provides
them with the only sense of security they have in an otherwise
dangerous, isolated, and uncertain life of public service.
In order to appreciate the importance of secrecy, the intelligence
collection process must be fully understood. Intelligence agencies
gather information by several methods, including the use of open,
technological, and human intelligence sources.3 Case officers typically engage in human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, which is

1. For purposes of this Note, the term “case officer” means any individual who is
employed by the United States and clandestinely engaged in intelligence activities. Although
the CIA is primarily responsible for human intelligence collection, other government agencies
within the intelligence community may occasionally participate in such efforts. See MARK M.
LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 94 (3d ed. 2006). Subsequently, the
term “case officer” is not exclusive to covert officers employed by the CIA. Given this
definition, a “case officer” is necessarily included within the definition of a “covert agent”—the
term used in federal statutory law. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50
U.S.C. § 426(4) (2006) (including three groups of individuals within the definition of “covert
agent”: (1) specified current and retired employees of the intelligence community; (2) certain
U.S. citizens whose intelligence relationships to the United States are classified; and (3) other
individuals whose past or present intelligence relationships to the United States are classified
as a result of their operational assistance to an intelligence agency as agents, informants, or
sources, both past and present).
2. See ARTHUR S. HULNICK, FIXING THE SPY MACHINE: PREPARING AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 30, 173 (1999) (explaining that secrecy,
including the confidentiality of intelligence sources, is an essential element of espionage). The
U.S. Supreme Court also declared that secrecy is implicit to the “integrity of the intelligence
process.” CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 (1985). Without secrecy, the Court stated, the CIA
would be “virtually impotent.” Id. In further explaining this concept, the Court quoted
President George Washington as writing that “‘[t]he necessity of procuring good intelligence,
is apparent and need not be further urged.... For upon secrecy, success depends in most
Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated.’” Id. at 172 n.16.
3. See generally LOWENTHAL, supra note 1, at 79-104 (providing an overview of the
various intelligence collection methods).
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also referred to as espionage or spying.4 The HUMINT method
involves clandestine surveillance and case officers’ recruitment of
“assets,”5 including the use of foreign nationals to spy.6 Because case
officers must operate under a subterfuge, which provides them with
plausible explanations for their presence within a foreign state,7
secrecy is critical to their safety and the value of their work.
If a case officer’s identity is compromised, then the result can
have drastic effects on that officer’s individual welfare.8 A discovered case officer may be subjected to great personal and physical
risk, particularly if that officer has a nonofficial cover.9 Not only
may the case officer be subjugated to adverse treatment, but those
connected to that officer, including family and friends, may also be
endangered.10 Moreover, exposing a case officer’s identity can
negatively affect that officer’s livelihood. Exposed case officers often
lose their ability to operate clandestinely abroad, therefore denying
that individual the opportunity to continue a career as a case
officer.11
The unauthorized disclosure of a case officer’s identity can also
have significant national security implications, as it impedes the
intelligence process and frustrates foreign diplomacy. These implications are illustrated by four possible consequences resulting from
an unauthorized disclosure. First, the government must sacrifice
both its investment in an exposed case officer and the experience,

4. Id. at 94.
5. For purposes of this Note, the term “asset” means any foreign national serving as an
agent, informant, or source. An “agent” is a foreign national who engages in espionage by
providing information to the United States that would otherwise be unobtainable.
6. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 1, at 94 (suggesting that most HUMINT efforts consist
of case officers’ recruitment of foreign agents); see also HULNICK, supra note 2, at 23.
7. LOWENTHAL, supra note 1, at 95 (explaining that case officers provided with official
covers are perceived to hold other government positions, whereas officers with nonofficial
covers are perceived to work and live in a nongovernmental capacity and avoid any display
of an overt connection between themselves and their government).
8. See Meri West Maffet, Note, Open Secrets: Protecting the Identity of the CIA’s
Intelligence Gatherers in a First Amendment Society, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1723, 1750 (1981).
9. LOWENTHAL, supra note 1, at 100.
10. See infra Part I.A (providing instances in which unauthorized disclosures of case
officers’ identities have resulted in attacks on the identified officers’ homes).
11. See infra Part I.A.
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knowledge, and ability that the officer possessed.12 Second, similar
to personal associations, an uncovered case officer’s professional
connections may be imperiled, which include coworkers and
recruited assets.13 Third, the effects of exposure may demoralize
current case officers and reduce the future applicant pool by
discouraging potential recruits from applying.14 Finally, there is the
possibility of significant political embarrassment to the government
12. Given the complex networking and intricate relationships inherent in intelligence
collection, replacing a case officer is inefficient and costly. See discussion infra Part I.A. The
time and expense applied to reestablishing intelligence networks can expose the United States
to adverse repercussions that may have otherwise been avoided.
13. See Maffet, supra note 8 (citing Admiral Stansfield M. Turner, Dir. of Cent.
Intelligence (DCI), Address to the San Francisco Press Club (Aug. 11, 1980)) (stating that
exposure may reveal “the methods of recruitment and operation employed by the sponsoring
agency, thereby facilitating the identification of additional operatives”). Both additional case
officers and foreign nationals may be uncovered as part of the chain reaction of a single
disclosure. Any known colleagues of an exposed officer may be jeopardized, in terms of both
their physical safety and ability to conduct covert affairs. The effects of losing one case officer,
therefore, are multiplied with the threat of additional personnel losses. In addition, foreign
nationals whom the exposed officer recruited as assets may be discovered and executed for
espionage against their respective governments. HULNICK, supra note 2, at 30. The possibility
of impending death could deter past and future foreign nationals from continuing their
intelligence relationship if they view the exposure as a breach of confidentiality and lose trust
in the United States. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985); Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 512 (1980) (“The continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the
CIA’s ability to guarantee the security of information that might compromise them and even
endanger the personal safety of foreign agents.”). For example, reacting to the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, former DCI Stansfield M. Turner explained:
[W]e have had a number of sources discontinue work with us.... [and] more ... tell
us that they are very nervous about continuing work with us. We have had very
strong complaints from a number of foreign intelligence services with whom we
conduct liaison, who have questioned whether they should continue exchanging
information with us, for fear it will not remain secret. I cannot estimate to you
how many potential sources or liaison arrangements have never germinated
because people were unwilling to enter into business with us.
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 512-13 (internal quotation marks omitted). This cascading effect, arising
from a single disclosure, can plague intelligence collection by undermining other intelligence
operations and destroying information networks.
14. Maffet, supra note 8, at 1750-51 (citing Proposals To Criminalize the Unauthorized
Disclosure of the Identities of Undercover United States Intelligence Officers and Agents:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
96th Cong. 15 (1980) (statement of Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director of the CIA)); Admiral
Stansfield M. Turner, DCI, Address to the San Francisco Press Club (Aug. 11, 1980)
(explaining that, in addition to reducing the applicant pool, exposure may also prompt case
officers to take fewer risks and “revert to more defensive, time consuming, and costly means
of operation to avoid detection”); see also Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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that dispatches an uncovered case officer.15 Because of the personal
and national security implications identity exposure can have, case
officers’ identities remain secret.
Even with these cumulative threats arising from unauthorized
disclosures, the U.S. intelligence apparatus remains the most
transparent intelligence system in the world.16 Throughout the
history of the United States, however, there has been incessant
controversy over the level of secrecy in the intelligence community.17
Responsibility for safeguarding secrecy within the U.S. intelligence
community is largely placed upon internal safeguards rather than
codified law.18 While the debate over secrecy continues, particularly
regarding the prevention of unauthorized disclosures of classified
information, there is a narrow class of information that Congress
has affirmatively sought to protect—the identities of case officers.
Although some U.S. presidents were importunate about the need to
keep case officers’ identities secret for years,19 it was not until 1982
that Congress recognized the importance of such a measure, when
it passed the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA).20 The

15. Halperin, 629 F.2d at 148; LOWENTHAL, supra note 1, at 100; see also Maffet, supra
note 8, at 1751 (offering a short discussion on how unauthorized exposures affect foreign
relations).
16. HULNICK, supra note 2, at 3, 180; see also Snepp, 444 U.S. at 523 n.13 (referring to
statements from former DCI William E. Colby that foreign states generally have a stricter
secrecy code than the United States).
17. See generally STEPHEN F. KNOTT, SECRET AND SANCTIONED: COVERT OPERATIONS AND
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1996) (providing a historical overview of the executive branch’s
struggle to maintain secrecy in the intelligence process).
18. See LOWENTHAL, supra note 1, at 204-05 (highlighting rules and regulations, such as
the security clearance and classified information systems, which aim to ensure confidentiality
in intelligence matters); see also Sims, 471 U.S. at 167 (citing the National Security Act of
1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)) (“Congress has made the Director of [National] Intelligence
‘responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.’”).
19. See, e.g., KNOTT, supra note 17, at 125-26 (explaining that former presidents defended
against efforts by Congress to reveal the identities of spies working on behalf of the United
States). In arguing that information about covert activity was not privy to congressional
inquiries, President James K. Polk stated that “‘the situation of the country may make it
necessary to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining information or rendering other
important services who could never be prevailed upon to act if they entertained the least
apprehension that their names or their agency would in any contingency be divulged.’” Id.
20. The IIPA is codified under Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947. Intelligence
Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426 (2006).
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IIPA was specifically designed to outlaw the unauthorized disclosure of case officers’ identities.
Despite its noble purpose and the need to protect case officers’
identities, since its enactment, the IIPA has been rarely utilized and
largely ineffective.21 Its limited application is attributable to the
uncovering of three factors that have plagued the IIPA throughout
its over twenty-five year existence: (1) the availability of another,
but equally insufficient, espionage-related statute; (2) the IIPA’s
inherent limitations; and (3) a lack of political initiative to enforce
the IIPA.22 The Valerie Plame Wilson affair is a glaring example of
the IIPA’s limited application.23 Additionally, the Plame affair
serves as a useful case study for illustrating two of the factors
inhibiting the IIPA’s application—namely, the law’s inherent
limitations and the lack of political will to enforce the law.24 Upon
analyzing the Plame affair and other instances in which the IIPA
could have been applied, it is evident that, in order to effectively
serve its purpose and avoid becoming completely defunct, the IIPA
must be amended. This Note details the need for an immediate and
comprehensive amendment to the IIPA, which will address the
IIPA’s three debilitating factors by expanding the class of protected
persons and easing the narrowness of its offenses. Part I provides
a brief background to the IIPA, including the historical events that
motivated its enactment and an overview of its purpose and scope.
Part II discusses the limited application of the IIPA, especially in
the context of its intended purpose and scope, and the three factors
inhibiting its enforcement. Part III provides policy justifications for
amending the IIPA and suggests proposals to be included in an
amendment—particularly, expanding the class of protected persons
and easing the narrowness of its offenses. In the end, this Note
concludes that the IIPA, if properly amended, can become a viable
and valuable safety mechanism in preventing the unauthorized
disclosure of case officers’ identities. Such an amendment will add
substance to a law that has been disguised as effective.

21.
22.
23.
24.

See discussion infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
See infra Part II.B-C.
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE IIPA
A. Historical Context
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the systematic exposure
of case officers’ identities rattled the U.S. intelligence community.
Numerous media exposures of clandestine operations prompted
criticisms of the CIA for its involvement in what some believed to be
questionable activities.25 Soon, dissidents dedicated to the eradication of the CIA surfaced within the United States and abroad.26 The
movement became so pervasive that publications emerged, determined to undermine CIA operations. A former CIA case officer even
authored and edited several of these publications.27 Eventually, the
intelligence community’s worst fears regarding the unveiling of case
officers’ identities became reality.28
In 1975, three gunmen assassinated the CIA station chief for
Greece, Richard S. Welch, outside of his Athens home.29 Welch’s
murder came eighteen months following his exposure as a CIA case

25. See Robert W. Bivins, Note, Silencing the Name Droppers: The Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 841, 843 (1984) (referring to alleged CIA
involvement in an attempted Chilean coup as an example of an uncovered covert operation
that elicited public criticism).
26. See id.
27. Former CIA case officer Philip Agee founded and edited CounterSpy, a magazine
published during the 1970s and 1980s, and CovertAction Quarterly, previously known as
CovertAction Information Bulletin. “Writing in CounterSpy, Agee said that ‘the most effective
and important systematic efforts to combat the CIA that can be undertaken right now are, I
think, the identification, exposure and neutralization of its people working abroad.’”
Kidnaping in Vienna, Murder in Athens, TIME, Jan. 5, 1976, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,947609,00.html. Agee also authored several books critical of the
CIA, which listed the names of alleged case officers along with the location of their overseas
assignments and their biographical information. See generally PHILIP AGEE, DIRTY WORK: THE
CIA IN WESTERN EUROPE (Philip Agee & Louis Wolf eds., 1978); PHILIP AGEE, DIRTY WORK 2:
THE CIA IN AFRICA (Ellen Ray et al. eds., 1979); PHILIP AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY
(1975) [hereinafter AGEE, INSIDE THE COMPANY]. Agee’s primary objective was the abolition of
the CIA, and he viewed the exposure of covert officers as a means by which to accomplish this
goal. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283-85 & n.2 (1981) (quoting a 1974 statement by Agee).
28. The framework for and much of the following information in this subsection was
adapted from the extensive historical account compiled and described by Robert W. Bivins.
See generally Bivins, supra note 25, at 843-45.
29. Kidnaping in Vienna, Murder in Athens, supra note 27.
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officer in CounterSpy magazine.30 Although CounterSpy editor
Philip Agee denied that his actions resulted in Welch’s murder,31 the
White House and the intelligence community contended that Agee’s
publication was indirectly responsible.32
In 1980, Louis Wolf, the editor of the CovertAction Information
Bulletin, held a press conference to disclose the identities of fifteen
purported CIA case officers working in the U.S. embassy in
Kingston, Jamaica.33 Wolf revealed the case officers’ biographical
information, home addresses, telephone numbers, and automobile
descriptions, including license plate numbers.34 He claimed that one
of the named case officers, N. Richard Kinsman, was the CIA station
chief for Jamaica.35 Fewer than forty-eight hours following this
press conference, Kinsman’s home came under a barrage of machine
gun fire and grenade attack.36 Three days later, another unsuccessful assassination attempt was mounted against the home of one of
the other identified case officers.37 Because of these incidents, the

30. Scott Shane, There Are Leaks. And Then There Are Leaks., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006,
§ 4, at 4.
31. See Fred Attewill, Renegade CIA Agent Agee Dies, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 9, 2008,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/09/cuba.usa1 (quoting Agee as contending that
President George H.W. Bush “‘came in as CIA director in the month after the assassination
and he intensified the campaign, spreading the lie that I was the cause of the assassination’”).
32. Bivins, supra note 25, at 844 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-201, at 7 (1981), as reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145, 151-52); see also Haig, 453 U.S. at 285 n.7 (quoting the former CIA
Deputy Director for Operations, who, in speaking generally about Agee’s actions, explained
that the unauthorized disclosures were “‘thinly-veiled invitations to violence’” that “‘markedly
increased the likelihood of individuals so identified being the victims of violence’”). But see Bill
To Penalize Uncovering of Agents Passed by Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1982, at A20
(explaining that others claimed that Welch’s identity was already widely known, as he resided
in a home typically occupied by senior CIA case officers).
33. Jo Thomas, Gunmen in Jamaica Hit Home of U.S. Aide, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1980, § 1,
at 1.
34. Id.
35. Samuel T. Francis, The Intelligence Identities Protection Act (S. 391, H.R. 4), HERITAGE
FOUND., NAT’L SEC. & DEF. BULL., Nov. 1, 1981, at 1, 2, available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/NationalSecurity/IB70.cfm.
36. Thomas, supra note 33.
37. Francis, supra note 35, at 2; Bivins, supra note 25, at 844 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-201,
at 8 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145, 152).
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U.S. government was forced to remove all of the named case officers
and their families from Jamaica.38
In 1981, the newspaper Nuevo Diario, a pro-Sandinista publication, identified thirteen CIA case officers stationed in the U.S.
embassy in Managua, Nicaragua.39 Some of these case officers
received death threats and others were attacked in their homes.40
The U.S. government officials in Managua insisted that there was
a nexus between Agee’s visit to Nicaragua and Nuevo Diario’s
printing of the names.41 Along with these unsuccessful assassination
attempts, the same year also brought the murders of two Americans, Michael P. Hammer and Mark David Pearlman. Hammer and
Pearlman were murdered in San Salvador after Agee accused their
employer, the American Institute for Free Labor and Development
(AIFLD), of being a CIA front organization for intelligence operations in El Salvador.42
In 1982, Cuban intelligence officials, along with the editors of
the CovertAction Information Bulletin, visited Mozambique.43
Coincidentally, following this visit, the Mozambique government
expelled six Americans from its country on charges of espionage.44
These five incidents are only the most publicized examples—
particularly because each was associated with either the infamous
Agee or Wolf—of the results of unauthorized disclosures of case
officers’ identities. They exemplify the dangers threatening the lives
of exposed case officers, their families, and those associated with the
officers. It should be noted that these same threats also surround
individuals incorrectly identified as case officers,45 as those wishing
to cause harm are unlikely to distinguish between exposures that
are credible and those that are not.

38. Bivins, supra note 25, at 844 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-201, at 8 (1981), as reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145, 152).
39. Id. (citing 128 CONG. REC. S1168 (1982) (statement of Sen. Barry M. Goldwater)).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing 128 CONG. REC. S1168 (1982) (statement of Sen. Barry M. Goldwater)).
42. Judith Miller, Solicitor General Calls 2 Americans Killed in El Salvador ‘Under Cover,’
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1981, at A10.
43. Bivins, supra note 25, at 844-45 n.29.
44. Id.
45. See Francis, supra note 35 (indicating that some case officers are falsely identified,
either by error or “deliberate fabrication”).
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The preceding events are also illustrative of the numerous, less
dramatic effects that accompany identity exposure. For example,
after a case officer is publicly identified, the value of that individual to covert operations is lost, as the officer can never operate
in a clandestine position again.46 The intelligence community
must then replace the case officer, often at great difficulty and
expense.47 Moreover, the longstanding relationships and sources
the case officer established must be reconstructed or abandoned.48
Consequently, even when no physical harm ensues, the intelligence
community and the exposed case officer’s career may still be
severely damaged.49
B. The Legislative Response
By the early 1980s, Agee and Wolf claimed to have revealed over
three thousand intelligence-related identities combined.50 These
systematic exposures, aimed at destroying U.S. clandestine intelligence efforts, “preceded and may have contributed to circumstances resulting in the death or attempted assassination of some
CIA officers, expulsion of others from a foreign country following
charges of spying, and impairment of relations with foreign
intelligence sources.”51 This conclusion to these dramatic circumstances prompted Congress to respond.

46. Id. at 3.
47. See, e.g., Bivins, supra note 25, at 844 n.26 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-201, at 8 (1981), as
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145, 153) (stating that removing the exposed case officers from
Jamaica, who were identified by Wolf, was costly and difficult).
48. Francis, supra note 35, at 3.
49. Id.; see also discussion supra text accompanying notes 8-15 (providing a more detailed
discussion of the effects the unauthorized disclosure of a case officer’s identity has on an
individual and national security).
50. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT 2 (2003), available at http://fas.org/irp/
crs/RS21636.pdf (explaining that Agee revealed over one thousand intelligence-related
identities and Wolf revealed over two thousand, primarily through the CovertAction
Information Bulletin in a section entitled “Naming Names”). This number includes those Agee
identified in a twenty-six page list contained within one of his books. AGEE, INSIDE THE
COMPANY, supra note 27, at 599-624.
51. BAZAN, supra note 50.
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Lawmakers realized that adequate legal redress was needed to
prevent further exposures, given that there were no existing laws or
regulations to prevent the activities in which Agee, Wolf, and others
were engaged.52 This provided the impetus for Congress to draft new
legislation to address the problem directly. In 1982, after several
years and many attempts to pass such a measure,53 the House and
Senate finally approved a bill that garnered overwhelming support.54 Bipartisan support for the bill was reinforced with backing
from both the Carter and Reagan administrations and the intelligence community.55 On June 23, 1982, President Ronald W. Reagan
signed the bill into law, thus establishing the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act.56
C. An Overview of the Purpose and Scope of the IIPA
The IIPA criminalizes, under certain circumstances, the intentional unauthorized disclosure of a case officer’s identity when that
disclosure is accomplished by either directly naming an officer or
providing information that leads to the exposure of an officer.57
Not only does the IIPA protect the identities of case officers, but it
also protects other individuals who are integral to HUMINT—specifically, foreign agents, informants, and sources.58 These “assets”
comprise the networks case officers establish while operating
52. See Bivins, supra note 25, at 845 (explaining that the National Security Act proved
to be an inadequate remedy to situation). See generally Maffet, supra note 8, at 1725-49
(discussing how, before the enactment of the IIPA, there were no laws to protect directly
against the unauthorized disclosure of case officers’ identities, and those that were even
remotely applicable suffered from serious deficiencies).
53. See James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy After the Cold War: The Role of Congress,
34 B.C. L. REV. 451, 484 (1993) (explaining that there were fifteen attempts to pass
legislation); Michael Wright & Caroline Rand Herron, A Bid To Insure Secret Agents Stay
That Way, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1981, § 4, at 2 (stating that discussion surrounding the
legislation lasted for more than five years).
54. See Bill To Penalize Uncovering of Agents Passed by Senate, supra note 32. The Senate
passed S. 391 with a vote of 81 to 4 and the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4 with a
vote of 315 to 32. Id.
55. Francis, supra note 35, at 4-5.
56. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Remarks on Signing H.R. 4 Into
Law, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 829 (June 23, 1982).
57. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-426 (2006).
58. See id. §§ 421, 426.
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clandestinely abroad.59 Penetration of these elaborate networks and
the identification of the individuals comprising them can ultimately
endanger case officers, as the connections may be traced back to
particular officers.60 Moreover, if exposed, assets are likely to be
subject to adverse treatment.61 Uncertainty surrounding the
confidentiality of their relationship with the United States will
discourage assets from providing helpful information, thus severely
restricting the value of HUMINT.62 For these reasons, Congress
appropriately protected the identities of agents, informants, and
sources, in addition to case officers. Assets and case officers are
collectively referred to as “covert agents” in the statutory language.63
There are three categories of offenses under the IIPA.
Applicability of each offense is based upon an individual’s ability
to access classified information and the nature of the subsequent
unauthorized disclosure.64 The IIPA addresses penalties for violations by both government “insiders” and “outsiders.”65 Generally, it
is illegal for an individual to expose the identity of a “covert agent”
when (1) the disclosing individual has or used to have access to
classified information that identifies a covert agent,66 (2) the disclosing individual learns the identity of a covert agent as a result of
having access to other classified information,67 or (3) the disclosing

59. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 13.
62. See supra note 13.
63. See 50 U.S.C. § 426(4); see also supra note 1 (providing definitions of terms used
within both the statutory language and this Note).
64. See 50 U.S.C. § 421.
65. See Susan D. Charkes, Note, The Constitutionality of the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1983). “Insiders” are government employees
who have access to classified information. Id. at 730. The IIPA distinguishes between two
types of government “insiders” based upon an individual’s ability to access certain categories
of classified information. Id. Conversely, “outsiders” are nongovernment employees who are
able to indirectly access classified information. Id. A typical “outsider” uncovers classified
information through the public domain or an “inside” source. See id. at 731.
66. 50 U.S.C. § 421(a). This category covers current and former government “insiders” who
have or had access to a specific category of classified information that directly identifies
“covert agents.”
67. Id. § 421(b). This category covers current government “insiders” who have access to
classified information but not the specific class of information that identifies “covert agents.”
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individual has no direct access to classified information but engages
in a “pattern of activities” intended to identify and expose covert
agents with a reasonable belief that it will “impair or impede ...
foreign intelligence activities.”68 Disclosures by government officials
or personnel (“insiders”) are covered under the first two categories
of offenses, with the difference between the two offenses being the
perpetrator’s security clearance level or any other ability to access
certain classified information. The third category of offenses applies
to disclosures by any nongovernment personnel (“outsiders”), such
as members of the media or academia.
The three categories of offenses share four elements. First, there
must be an intentional unauthorized disclosure of a “covert agent’s”
identity.69 Second, an individual who is not authorized to access
classified information must receive the intentional, unauthorized
disclosure.70 Third, the perpetrator must know that the intentional,
unauthorized disclosure will identify a “covert agent.”71 Finally, the
perpetrator must also know that the U.S. government is taking
affirmative steps to conceal the identity of the “covert agent” that
the perpetrator is prepared to reveal.72 If an individual qualifies
under one of the three categories of offenses and these four elements
are present, then that individual may be imprisoned for a period of
three to ten years, with the additional possibility of a civil penalty.73
The remaining provisions within the IIPA set forth a number of
defenses and exceptions, as well as definitions of the terminology
used within the statute.74 For example, in terms of defenses and
exceptions, if the U.S. government discloses the “covert agent’s”
identity before the perpetrator makes the disclosure, this will serve

These individuals are able to infer the identity of a “covert agent” from circumstantial
evidence derived from the classified information to which they are privileged access.
68. Id. § 421(c). This category covers any person, typically “outsiders,” involved in the
systematic exposure of “covert agents” with a reasonable belief that such activity will weaken
U.S. intelligence efforts. Wolf is an example of an individual who would be categorized under
this classification.
69. Id. § 421.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. §§ 422-426.
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as a defense to prosecution.75 A similar defense may be employed if
the “covert agent” is self-identified before the perpetrator makes the
disclosure.76 These defenses are common to any of the three IIPA
offenses.
II. THE IIPA’S LIMITED APPLICATION
On its surface, the purpose and scope of the IIPA appear to create
an effective law to punish contemptible acts. Since its inception,
however, the IIPA has faded into an insufficient and overlooked
tool in criminal prosecutions. The 1985 prosecution of Sharon M.
Scranage represents the only instance in which anyone has ever
been charged under the IIPA.77 While posted overseas with the CIA,
Scranage leaked the identities of CIA case officers to her boyfriend
Michael Soussoudis, a suspected intelligence agent in the Ghanaian
intelligence service.78 Because Scranage pleaded guilty to the
charges,79 the courts have not yet had an opportunity to comment on
the IIPA.
Some critics argue that the lack of IIPA prosecutions indicates
that the unauthorized disclosure of case officers’ identities is no
longer an issue, and therefore, the IIPA should be repealed.80 It is
evident, however, that the unauthorized disclosure of both case
officers’ and assets’ identities remains a critical problem. Congress
validated this belief when it directed the executive branch to enforce
the IIPA following a number of relevant, unauthorized disclosures
in the mid-1990s.81 Since the IIPA’s inception in 1982, there have

75. Id. § 421(a).
76. Id. § 421(d).
77. Richard B. Schmitt, Rare Statute Figures in Rove Case, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2005, at
A15.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that a few observers believe that the absence of prosecutions
displays the success of the government’s increased efforts to protect case officers’ identities);
Jesse Walker, Agee’s Revenge: It’s Past Time To Kill the Intelligence Identities Protection Act,
REASON.COM, July 14, 2005, http://reason.com/archives/2005/07/14/agees-revenge (“The law
is a solution in search of a problem.”).
81. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832,
at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000.

2010]

INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT

2283

been plenty of publicly known instances in which intelligencerelated identities were wrongfully exposed.82 These include the
Valerie Plame Wilson affair.83 In each occurrence, the disclosing
individual either avoided charges or was charged under another
statute, usually espionage related.84
Critics contend that the IIPA was passed to prevent a particular
form of unauthorized disclosures of case officers’ identities—specifically, the systematic exposures by Agee and Wolf.85 Although the
IIPA is a narrow law, enacted for a specific purpose, its language
simply does not support the argument that its scope must be confined to thwarting only those activities in which Agee and his cohorts participated. Instead, its language criminalizes nearly every
intentional, unauthorized disclosure of intelligence-related identities, not simply mass publication of those identities by “outsiders.”86
82. See, e.g., id. (indicating that, around 1997, there were several incidents involving the
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence-related identities by both journalists and public
officials, which, at least in one instance, might have led to a number of deaths); DEF. PERS.
SEC. RESEARCH CTR., DEF. HUMAN RES. ACTIVITY, DEP’T OF DEF., ESPIONAGE CASES (19752004): SUMMARIES AND SOURCES 1-2, 16-17, 21, 26-28, 35, 37, 42, 44, 47 (2004), available at
http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/PP&O/PS/pss/Espionage_Cases_75-04.pdf [hereinafter ESPIONAGE
CASES] (listing, in addition to Scranage, those indicted or convicted for activities involving the
revelation of intelligence-related identities while spying: Aldrich H. Ames, Frederick C.
Hamilton, Robert P. Hanssen, Edward L. Howard, Karl F. Koecher, Steven J. Lalas, Harold
J. Nicholson, Earl E. Pitts, Richard C. Smith, and Douglas Tsou); Peter Finn, Detainees
Shown CIA Officers’ Photos, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2009, at A1 (reporting that military defense
attorneys might have unlawfully identified CIA case officers in photographs provided to
Guantanamo Bay detainees); infra note 136 (explaining that a former U.S. Senator and State
Department official intentionally revealed to the public the identity of a CIA informant).
Based upon the substance of the leaked information, not all unauthorized disclosures of
intelligence-related identities may be made public. See ESPIONAGE CASES, supra, at i. It is
logical for the government, once it discovers that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred, to
conceal that disclosure in an attempt to prevent further classified information from being
exposed. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104832, at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000 (intimating that
the government has not sought the prosecution of government officials under the IIPA for fear
of exposing additional classified information during the course of a trial). Consequently, there
could be additional examples that have simply not leaked into the public forum.
83. See infra Part II.B-C.
84. See ESPIONAGE CASES, supra note 82.
85. See, e.g., Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., The Occasions of Secrecy, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 579,
602 (1986); Schmitt, supra note 77; Walker, supra note 80 (quoting U.S. Representative
Charles W. Young during the House debate over the bill as saying, “‘What we’re after today
are the Philip Agees of the world’”).
86. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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A few comments derived from the IIPA’s legislative history supporting the proposition of a limited objective cannot override the actual
purpose and scope of the IIPA’s final language, which Congress
overwhelmingly approved.87
It follows, therefore, that the IIPA remains a relevant protective
device in the intelligence process and can serve as a useful deterrent
to illegal activity. Yet, upon examining its over twenty-five year
existence, there are three factors contributing to the IIPA’s limited
application: (1) the availability of an espionage statute that imposes
more considerable penalties, (2) the IIPA’s inherent limitations, and
(3) a lack of political initiative to enforce the IIPA.
A. Availability of the Espionage Act
Most exposures of case officers, agents, informants, and sources
occur when individuals illegally transmit information to foreign
sources.88 Consequently, many of these unauthorized disclosures can
be packaged as part of an amalgamated charge of spying under the
Espionage Act. Compared to the IIPA, the broader Espionage Act
imposes a more significant penalty for the unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence-related identities only if that exposure arises out of
the more inclusive crime of spying.89 Limitations of the Espionage
Act were revealed, however, when the government was unable to
halt the publication of case officers’ identities by individuals other
than spies, predominately “outsiders.” Although distinguishable
from espionage, these systematic exposures by nonspies have a similar effect, in that they undermine U.S. intelligence efforts.90 Because
the Espionage Act is inapplicable to this type of unauthorized

87. See supra note 54.
88. See ESPIONAGE CASES, supra note 82 (indicating that, of the listed occasions in which
intelligence-related identities were illegally disclosed, in only one instance—the Scranage
case—was the disclosing individual someone other than a spy).
89. See Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2006) (containing several offenses
that are punishable by death or life imprisonment, including the dissemination of defense
information, which can, under certain circumstances, encompass the unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence-related identities). But see infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (summarizing potential difficulties in applying the Espionage Act to the unauthorized disclosure
of intelligence-related identities).
90. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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disclosure, the government recognized the need for an acceptable
resolution to address the loophole.91 This prompted the passage of
the narrower IIPA.
Despite the existence of the Espionage Act, the IIPA remains
essential to preventing a particular class of exposures. Nevertheless,
if an unauthorized disclosure is punishable under either the IIPA or
the Espionage Act, prosecutors will usually charge the perpetrator
under the latter, because it will yield a greater penalty for the same
wrong.92 As long as most unauthorized disclosures of intelligencerelated identities occur during the course of spying, prosecutions
under the Espionage Act will substantially outnumber those under
the IIPA. The opportunity for IIPA prosecutions, therefore, will be
reduced. Notwithstanding this natural limitation on its use, there
remain situations in which the IIPA is ideal. Even in those situations, however, the following two factors have considerably impeded
the IIPA’s application.
B. Inherent Limitations
Following the Scranage prosecution, the IIPA experienced eighteen years of dormancy. Once a prominent topic of discussion
during the early 1980s, the IIPA eventually became an obscure law
hidden within the U.S. Code. As it has aged, the IIPA’s limitations
have become apparent. The narrowness of the IIPA creates intrinsic defects in its application. For example, the IIPA protects an
exceptionally limited class of intelligence-related individuals that
manages to qualify under the statutory definition of a “covert
agent.”93 Additionally, the restrictiveness of its offenses discourages prosecutors from utilizing the IIPA, because the evidentiary

91. See Maffet, supra note 8, at 1738-41 (surveying the possibility of applying the
Espionage Act to the protection of intelligence-related identities and the difficulties that arise
therefrom, with much focus as to whether such unauthorized disclosures always relate to
“national defense” and whether the Espionage Act is applicable to the prosecution of
“outsiders”).
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421, 426(4)(A) (2006).
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burdens are too great.94 The IIPA, therefore, is largely ignored.
These inherent shortcomings, accounting for the second factor in the
IIPA’s limited application, are most clearly illustrated by the Plame
affair.
It was not until 2003 that the IIPA was thrust back into the limelight, causing people to question this little-known law. Discussion
of the IIPA resurfaced after Valerie Plame Wilson was exposed as
a CIA case officer in a newspaper column written by Robert D.
Novak.95 Members of the George W. Bush administration, namely
Richard L. Armitage (former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State), I.
Lewis “Scooter” Libby (former Chief of Staff to Vice President
Richard B. Cheney), and Karl C. Rove (former Deputy Chief of Staff
to the President), were investigated for their possible roles in
leaking Plame’s identity to various journalists.96 As the investigation commenced, the law for which President George H.W. Bush had
fought so vigorously,97 ironically, was contemplated as the principal
tool for criminally charging senior officials within his son’s administration.98

94. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832,
at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000 (suggesting that the
constrictiveness of the elements of an IIPA offense may be a reason behind its lack of
enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice, as prosecutors are unsure whether they can
prove each element).
95. Robert D. Novak, Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14, 2003, at A21 (“Wilson never
worked for the CIA, but his wife, Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on weapons of mass
destruction.”).
96. See generally Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 79-82 (D.D.C. 2007) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the alleged circumstances surrounding the leaking of Plame’s
identity and the individuals purportedly involved in her exposure), aff’d, 535 F.3d 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2825 (2009).
97. The IIPA garnered enthusiastic support from the Reagan administration. See supra
notes 53-56 and accompanying text. At the time of the IIPA’s enactment by President Reagan,
George H.W. Bush was Vice President and former DCI. Speaking on the topic of the
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence-related identities, President George H.W. Bush stated,
“‘I have nothing but contempt and anger for those who betray the trust by exposing the name
[sic] of our sources. They are, in my view, the most insidious of traitors.’” 151 CONG. REC.
S8268 (2005) (statement of Sen. Harry M. Reid (quoting President George H.W. Bush)).
98. See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 12-14, United States v. Libby, 495 F.
Supp. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 05-394).
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Ultimately, only Libby was indicted for the events surrounding
the unauthorized disclosure of Plame’s identity.99 Although Plame’s
identity was unlawfully exposed, the U.S. Department of Justice
Special Counsel assigned to the case, Patrick J. Fitzgerald, opted to
forgo IIPA charges against Libby due to a lack of evidence.100 As an
alternative, Fitzgerald charged Libby with making false statements,
obstruction of justice, and perjury.101 Even though it is uncertain
exactly what or how much evidence was lacking to charge Libby
under the IIPA, the problems in meeting the evidentiary requirements were likely correlative to the narrowness of the statute and
its offenses. Two of the elements, in particular, present complications when applied to the facts of the case.
One difficulty in applying the IIPA was determining Plame’s
status at the time of the unauthorized disclosure. The first element
of any IIPA offense requires that the exposed individual be within
a limited class of protected persons.102 Plame, therefore, must have
fallen within the definition of a “covert agent.”103 To qualify under
this definition, Plame’s identity and relationship with the CIA must
have been classified information,104 she must have served outside of
the United States at the time of her exposure or within five years
before her exposure,105 and the CIA must have been taking “affirmative measures” to conceal her identity at the time of the exposure.106
Although this language appears straightforward, many complications arise when the definition is applied. First, it is unclear what
assignments constitute clandestine service abroad during the fiveyear period. For example, a case officer may have short, sporadic
clandestine assignments outside of the country during a period
when that officer is officially stationed within the United States for

99. See generally Indictment, United States v. Libby, 495 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(No. 05-394).
100. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel,
J., concurring); see also Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 98.
101. See generally Indictment, supra note 99.
102. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2006); see also
supra Part I.C (discussing briefly the four elements common to any IIPA offense).
103. 50 U.S.C. § 421.
104. See id. § 426(4)(A)(i).
105. See id. § 426(4)(A)(ii).
106. See id. § 421.
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domestic assignments.107 Such a scenario may or may not constitute
clandestine service abroad.108 Second, there is inconsistency in
interpreting the standard for “affirmative measures” taken in
concealing a case officer’s identity. For instance, criticism may arise
over the adequacy of both the government’s and the case officer’s
efforts in concealing the officer’s identity, leading to skepticism that
there was an actual intent to maintain complete secrecy.109 In the
Libby prosecution, there were many questions regarding these two
issues, and therefore, debate ensued over whether Plame was, by
statutory definition, a “covert agent.”110 Eventually, Fitzgerald
concluded that Plame was a “covert agent” at the time of her
exposure, but this statement came only after he abandoned the
possibility of pursuing IIPA charges.111 Even though this was
Fitzgerald’s determination, it is unclear that a court would come to
the same conclusion given the ambiguity surrounding the term’s
definition. Fitzgerald’s recognition of this uncertainty regarding
Plame’s inclusion in the statutory class of protected persons might
have contributed to his decision not to charge Libby under the IIPA.
Even if Plame satisfied the “covert agent” element, the narrowness of the IIPA offenses presented difficulties in proving a second
element. Fitzgerald had to demonstrate that Libby possessed the
requisite knowledge that Plame was, indeed, covert and that the

107. See, e.g., Joel Seidman, Plame Was ‘Covert’ Agent at Time of Name Leak, MSNBC, May
29, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18924679/ (“[W]hile she was assigned to [CIA
headquarters], Plame, ‘engaged in temporary duty travel overseas on official business .... [S]he
traveled at least seven times ...., sometimes in true name and sometimes in alias—but always
using cover—whether official or non-official ... with no ostensible relationship to the CIA.’”
(quoting Plame’s unclassified CIA employment history)).
108. Cf. Adam Liptak, C.I.A. Inquiry May Hinge on What the Leaker Knew, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2005, at A14 (“‘I don’t believe the statute requires a permanent assignment abroad.
It can be trips abroad.’” (quoting Christopher Wolf, legal counsel for the Wilsons)).
109. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 77 (“[A former] deputy assistant attorney general under
President Reagan .... doubted Plame qualified as a ‘covert’ operative, and ... said that the CIA
was ‘cavalier’ about protecting her status.” (quoting Victoria Toensing)).
110. See generally Byron York, Valerie Plame: Was She, or Wasn’t She?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE,
Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200602060919.asp (analyzing evidence
used by the court regarding Plame’s covert status and efforts to conceal Plame’s identity at
and before the unauthorized disclosure).
111. Seidman, supra note 107 (“‘[Plame] was a covert CIA employee for who [sic] the CIA
was taking affirmative measures to conceal her intelligence relationship to the United
States.’” (quoting Plame’s unclassified CIA employment history)).
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government was taking affirmative steps to conceal her identity.112
He, however, possessed no direct evidence to this effect.113 Proving
the “knowledge” element would have been a demanding task for
Fitzgerald. If Fitzgerald and others had difficulty interpreting the
ambiguity of the term “covert agent,” then it is highly unlikely that
Libby unequivocally knew that Plame satisfied this statutory
definition. Likewise, interpreting the term “affirmative measures”
presents complications, and so proving Libby’s actual knowledge of
this would have been equally challenging. The difficulty in establishing the presence of such knowledge increased exponentially
when Libby failed to cooperate with the investigation. This uncooperativeness led to Libby’s conviction for making false statements,
obstruction of justice, and perjury.114 Without Libby’s cooperation,
it is doubtful that Fitzgerald could have successfully pursued IIPA
charges, as proving the “knowledge” element required Fitzgerald to
elicit information that only Libby likely possessed. Fitzgerald could
have possibly gathered circumstantial evidence from conversations
or statements that demonstrated Libby’s constructive knowledge of
Plame’s covert status, but this would have occurred in only the most
fortunate of scenarios given the confidential nature of the information at issue. In the end, the “knowledge” element exemplifies the
burdensome evidentiary demands necessary to establish culpability
under the narrow IIPA offenses and the investigative complications
that arise in satisfying those requirements.
Based on investigative reports and his decision not to pursue
Libby under the IIPA, Fitzgerald appeared to doubt that he could
overcome the two elemental difficulties the case presented: (1)
establishing that Plame fell within the limited class of protected
persons, and (2) proving that Libby possessed the requisite knowledge of both Plame’s covert status and the measures taken by the
government to conceal her identity. Ultimately, the uncertainty
surrounding the “covert agent” definition and the IIPA’s overwhelm112. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1980, 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)-(b) (2006).
113. Affidavit of Patrick J. Fitzgerald at 28 n.15, In re Special Counsel Investigation, 374
F. Supp. 2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 04-MS-407) (“To date, we have no direct evidence that
Libby knew or believed that Wilson’s wife was engaged in covert work.”).
114. Neil A. Lewis, Libby Guilty of Lying in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/washington/06cnd-libby.html.
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ing evidentiary demands—both results of the statute’s narrowness
—precluded its use against Libby and others involved in the leak.
These inherent limitations undermined the IIPA’s prosecutorial
value in penalizing the illegal activity it was anticipated to prevent.
C. Lack of Political Initiative
A third factor inhibiting the IIPA’s application is a lack of
political will to have a firm and consistent response to unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence-related identities,115 especially when such
disclosures come from within the government.116 Contributing to
this apathetic approach is (1) a concern that questions regarding
the IIPA’s constitutionality may produce political backlash,117 (2) a
fear that IIPA prosecutions may lead to the disclosure of further
classified information at trial,118 and (3) the desire to use unautho-

115. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832,
at 34-35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 3999-4000 (expressing
congressional displeasure with an “apparent unwillingness” to enforce the IIPA).
116. See James B. Bruce, The Consequences of Permissive Neglect: Laws and Leaks of
Classified Intelligence, 47 STUD. INTELLIGENCE 39, 43-44 (2003), available at https://www.
cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/docs/v47i1a04p.htm (citing a 1996
National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB) study reporting on the government’s
ability to control leaks of classified information) (explaining that the absence of political
initiative in enforcing unauthorized disclosures of classified information has evolved into a
mindset of “permissive neglect”).
117. See David Ignatius, Op-Ed., When Does Blowing Secrets Cross the Line?, WASH. POST,
July 2, 2000, at B7 (discussing how the lack of prosecutions regarding leaks of classified
information results from the Department of Justice wanting “to avoid a politically explosive
hunt for a journalist’s sources”); see also infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text (providing
further insight into the First Amendment concerns surrounding the IIPA).
118. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832,
at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000 (suggesting that the
risk of further disclosure of classified information during court proceedings may be a reason
behind the IIPA’s weak enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice); Bruce, supra note
116, at 47 (“The US government has shown a debilitating reluctance to pursue legal remedies
for the most serious leaks partly because subsequent courtroom publicity of sensitive
information subverts its first objective of protecting such information from further
disclosures.”); cf. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)) (explaining the difficulties in balancing the need for prosecution
and the possible damage resulting from the disclosure of secrets in a public trial when
charging an individual under the Espionage Act).
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rized disclosures as a vehicle to influence policy.119 Regardless of the
motivation, this lack of political initiative by the executive branch
has greatly contributed to the IIPA’s limited application.
One issue contributing to the lack of political will in enforcing
the IIPA is the constitutional concerns surrounding its language.
There is disquiet among commentators regarding the IIPA’s language when applied to the First Amendment.120 Some believe that the
IIPA’s language—particularly § 421(c), relating to the censoring of
“outsiders”—violates the freedoms of speech and press.121 At the
time of its enactment, however, there was bipartisan agreement
that the IIPA was constitutional,122 even following testimony by
several interest groups, including civil rights organizations, journalists, and legal scholars.123 Although there are informed arguments on each side of the constitutionality debate, the courts have
yet to weigh in on the issue because no IIPA prosecutions have
made their way to the bench.124
A general hesitancy to avoid uncertainty and constitutional
debate may assist in explaining the lack of political will in enforcing
the IIPA. From the standpoint of the government, it is better served

119. See Bruce, supra note 116, at 44 (citing a 1996 NACIPB study reporting on the
government’s ability to control leaks of classified information); see also LOWENTHAL, supra
note 1, at 204-05 (“Leaks occur for a variety of reasons: to show off some special knowledge,
to settle scores, or to promote or stop a policy.”).
120. Most discussion and analysis of the IIPA’s constitutionality has been limited to
student commentary. See infra note 121.
121. See generally, e.g., Charkes, supra note 65, at 748-53 (concluding that § 421(c) violates
the First Amendment, even if narrowly construed); Lawrence P. Gottesman, Note, The
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982: An Assessment of the Constitutionality of Section
601(c), 49 BROOK. L. REV. 479, 482-83, 515-16 (1983) (concluding that § 421(c) violates the
First Amendment). But see generally Ferguson, supra note 53, at 483, 489 (concluding that
Congress struck a proper balance between executive secrecy and free speech); Bivins, supra
note 25, at 842-43, 851, 859-61, 864 (concluding that the IIPA constitutes a permissible speech
restriction under either the compelling interest test or present danger test of the First
Amendment).
122. See BAZAN, supra note 50, at 4 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-201, at 14-18 (1982), as reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 145, 158-62; H.R. REP. NO. 97-580, at 7-10 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), as
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 170, 171-75) (explaining that the Senate Judiciary Committee
and the Conference Committee considered the constitutionality of the IIPA at length,
especially with regard to § 421(c) and its First Amendment implications, and both concluded
that its language would pass constitutional muster).
123. Ferguson, supra note 53, at 484-85.
124. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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prosecuting individuals under less confined, more reliable, and wellestablished laws. Greater predictability in evidentiary standards,
especially given the national security implications that accompany
a crime of this magnitude, can be a desirable asset when handling
a prosecution.125 From the perspective of elected officials within the
executive branch, they may want to avoid IIPA prosecutions,
particularly against journalists and other “outsiders,” because the
press will surely brand any attempt at doing so as a trampling of its
rights under the First Amendment. The constitutional concerns
surrounding the IIPA and the underlying political effects accompanying those apprehensions have contributed to the lack of political
will in enforcing the IIPA.
Another issue influencing the lack of political initiative in
enforcing the IIPA is the fear that prosecution will lead to further
disclosures of classified information in court, especially if the trial
is public. Deciding whether to charge an individual under the IIPA
involves a calculated cost-benefit analysis. For example, in debating
whether to pursue charges in the Plame affair, the CIA concluded,
“‘the public interest in allowing the criminal prosecution to proceed
outweighed the damage to national security that might reasonably
be expected from the official disclosure of [Plame’s] employment and
covert status.’”126 Although the Classified Information Procedures
Act (CIPA) exists to protect from further dissemination of classified
information under these circumstances,127 this safeguard has not
eased apprehension among prosecutors, as evidenced by the lack of
IIPA prosecutions.128
The final issue influencing the lack of political will in enforcing
the IIPA is the desire to use unauthorized disclosures as a vehicle
to influence policy. Along with serving as a case study in examining
the inherent limitations of the IIPA, the Plame affair also provides
a quintessential example of the lack of political will in keeping case

125. See, e.g., Part II.B.
126. Seidman, supra note 107.
127. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006); see also
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832, at 35
(1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000.
128. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832,
at 35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000.
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officers’ identities secret. Regardless of whether the IIPA was
violated, the Plame affair makes evident that the initial exposure of
Plame’s identity was motivated by the desire of some members of
the Bush administration to use the disclosure as a means to achieve
political ends.129
As a corollary to this, the obvious inferential question is whether
the executive branch zealously supported and pursued IIPA charges.
Trepidation about the possibility that the executive branch would
not actively pursue charges led to Fitzgerald’s appointment as
special counsel.130 Supporting the assertion that political forces were
lurking throughout the Plame affair is President Bush’s response to
the situation. The President quickly refined his position with regard
to how he would respond to members within his administration who
were discovered to be responsible for the exposure. He went from
saying that he would immediately dismiss anyone found to have
leaked Plame’s identity to stating that he would discharge members
of his administration only if they were found to have broken the

129. As an attempt to refute a report by Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV, in which
Ambassador Wilson concluded that Iraq did not attempt to purchase uranium from Niger,
senior members of the Bush administration spoke with journalists and provided them with
evidence to discredit Ambassador Wilson. See generally Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74,
78-81 (D.D.C. 2007). In so doing, these officials reportedly criticized the CIA’s handling of
Ambassador Wilson’s trip, given that Ambassador Wilson traveled to Niger at the request of
the CIA. See id. at 78-80. Armitage, Libby, and Rove all engaged in conversations with the
press, and each leaked Plame’s CIA status to various journalists. See id. at 78-81. The
exposure was motivated by the fact that Plame was Ambassador Wilson’s wife, and she was
allegedly responsible for arranging her husband’s trip to Niger. See id. at 78. According to the
Wilson complaint, Rove supposedly told a reporter that Plame was “fair game” in the debate
over the validity of Ambassador Wilson’s report. Id. at 80. Although it is obvious from
personal admissions and press reports that these three government officials played a distinct
role in the leaking of Plame’s identity, it is less clear that they actually violated the IIPA. The
difficulty in investigating and charging each official was likely attributable to various factors,
such as Libby’s uncooperativeness and the confining elements comprising an IIPA offense. See
supra Part II.B. For example, in terms of the IIPA’s confining elements, it is plausible that
Armitage, Libby, and Rove simply did not maintain the requisite knowledge that Plame was
a “covert agent” in accordance with the statutory definition. See supra notes 112-14 and
accompanying text (providing in detail the difficulties in proving the “knowledge” element).
Ultimately, one must presume that they did not violate the IIPA, given that Fitzgerald did
not pursue IIPA charges.
130. See David Johnston, Top Bush Aide Is Questioned in C.I.A. Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2004, at A1.
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law.131 Such a quick refinement of his position could be a result of
the Bush administration’s understanding that convicting anyone
under the IIPA would prove exceedingly difficult. Irrespective of
whether Armitage, Libby, or Rove violated the IIPA, the fact that
senior officials within a presidential administration, who publicly
exposed a CIA employee, can avoid adverse repercussions for that
action, simply because the sitting administration deemed they did
not technically violate the law, displays where protecting case
officers’ identities ranks on politicians’ priorities. This point is
further emphasized by President Bush’s decision to commute
Libby’s sentence for his conviction in the Plame affair before Libby
had even served any prison time.132
The Plame affair, however, is only one example of the lack of
political initiative in enforcing the IIPA.133 Over the past twenty-five
years, there have been several opportunities for the IIPA to be
tested against other potential defendants,134 but it has been used
only once.135 This lack of political will to enforce the IIPA has been
present throughout both Democratic and Republican presidential
administrations.136 Although specific reasons for the hesitancy to

131. See Examining the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (NPR radio broadcast July 19,
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4760261 (follow “Listen” hyperlink).
132. Amy Goldstein, Bush Commutes Libby’s Prison Sentence, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007,
at A1.
133. This does not suggest that the absence of IIPA charges following Fitzgerald’s
investigation was a result of political influence. The available evidence suggests only that
political forces were behind the initial unauthorized disclosure, not the decision of whether
to pursue IIPA charges. See supra note 129. The facts Fitzgerald elicited from the Plame affair
and the circumstances surrounding that investigation are not completely known, including
the government’s investigative capabilities in light of Libby’s obstruction of justice. For this
reason, any assertion that political influence was behind Fitzgerald’s decision to exclude the
IIPA from the Plame affair is unfounded, especially given Fitzgerald’s appointment as
independent special counsel.
134. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that Scranage represents the only
IIPA prosecution).
136. The Plame affair does not signify that the lack of political will in enforcing the IIPA
lies exclusively with Republicans. For instance, during the William J. Clinton administration,
Democrats failed to pursue charges against Richard A. Nuccio—an official within the
Department of State—and Democratic U.S. Senator Robert G. Torricelli after they both
publicly disclosed the identity of a CIA informant who they believed was involved in the
murder of a Guatemalan. See Shane, supra note 30. Furthermore, a congressional report,
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use the IIPA in each of the circumstances are unknown, the IIPA’s
inherent limitations and a lack of political will to overcome those
limitations are at least two contributing factors. Unless this
pervasive mindset within the executive branch suddenly changes,
it will continue to impede the IIPA’s application and effectiveness.
III. THE CRITICAL NEED FOR AN AMENDMENT
Even with evidence that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence-related identities remains a critical problem,137 the IIPA’s
application has been severely limited. The three preceding factors
have encumbered the IIPA’s effectiveness and enforcement in
situations when it was intended to penalize egregious behavior.138
As currently written, the IIPA is not only ineffective in its enforcement, but also it is not a formidable deterrent because it is used so
infrequently that its existence is unbeknownst to most people.
Consequently, the IIPA has failed to follow through in its intended
purpose—to protect case officers’ identities by imposing penalties on
those who intentionally disclose those identities without proper
authorization.139 Yet, case officers rely on the secrecy the IIPA is
supposed to protect as the final guardian of their safety while they
serve their country abroad.140 Unless the IIPA is significantly
amended, it risks falling into another extensive period of quiescence

published in late 1996, conveyed displeasure with the Clinton administration’s failure to
enforce the IIPA in several applicable situations. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832, at 34-35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 3999-4000.
137. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
138. See supra Part II.
139. See discussion supra Part I.C.
140. This is especially true given that case officers cannot always rely upon policymakers
and politicians to protect their identities. See supra Part II.C. Furthermore, case officers do
not have an adequate civil remedy to seek compensation for the adverse personal effects they
must endure as a result of their exposure. Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718-19 (1931)
(stating that public officers, whose character and conduct are open to free discussion and
debate in the press, have remedies in libel law rather than attempts to restrain publication).
See generally Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78, 82, 96 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying
plaintiffs the ability to seek civil compensation under a Bivens remedy for the unauthorized
disclosure of a case officer’s identity), aff’d, 535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 2825 (2009).
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with the increased possibility that it will become completely defunct.
Properly amending the IIPA will result in an effective law capable
of both punishing and deterring the unauthorized disclosure of
intelligence-related identities, thereby establishing a critical protective device for the intelligence community to utilize in enhancing
case officers’ safety and ensuring national security.
A. Policy Justifications
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]t is
‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation,”141 there has long been
debate over the balance of openness and secrecy in conducting
national security operations. Emerging from this debate is general
agreement that certain segments of classified information must
absolutely be protected from public disclosure,142 including the
identities of case officers.143 Exposing a case officer’s identity serves
no legitimate public purpose.144 Such unauthorized disclosures go
far beyond information that might contribute to informed public
debate on foreign policy or foreign intelligence activities.... It
does not alert to abuses; it does not further civil liberties; it does
not enlighten public debate; and it does not contribute one iota
to the goal of an educated and informed electorate. Instead, it
reflects a total disregard for the consequences that may jeopardize the lives and safety of individuals and damage the ability of

141. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S.
500, 509 (1964)).
142. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 n.3 (1980) (“The Government has a
compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national
security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our
foreign intelligence service.”).
143. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN
THE THROES OF REFORM 16-17 (2006); DuVal, supra note 85, at 598.
144. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, Remarks on Signing H.R. 4 Into Law,
18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 829 (June 23, 1982); see also Bivins, supra note 25, at 859-60
(setting forth reasons why identifying case officers to promote oversight and informed debate
is an unacceptable premise).
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the United States to safeguard the national defense and conduct
an effective foreign policy.145

Although public and media oversight of the executive branch is an
indispensible component in maintaining an honest and responsible
representative democracy, recklessly accusing the U.S. government
of misdeeds by identifying intelligence personnel endangers lives
and compromises national security. Promoting accountability in the
executive branch is achieved just as successfully by alerting the
public to abuses and wrongs without exposing names or supplying
personal, identifying information. This belief prompted bipartisan
support for the enactment of the IIPA.146 The IIPA, however, has
failed miserably,147 thus justifying the need for an amendment.
B. Constructing an Amendment
Upon analyzing the three factors contributing to the IIPA’s
limited application, the most significant of those factors—the IIPA’s
inherent limitations—can be addressed directly through an amendment. The IIPA’s shortcomings emanate from its narrowness.148
Propelling this narrowness is the exceptionally limited class of
intelligence-related identities the IIPA protects and the restrictiveness of the IIPA’s offenses. These two intrinsic defects must be the
primary focus of any amendment. Using the IIPA’s past failures, the
most helpful of which is the Plame affair, a comprehensive and effective amendment can be devised to address the inherent limitations that have plagued the IIPA from its beginning.
1. Expanding the Class of Protected Persons
One priority of an IIPA amendment must be expanding the class
of protected individuals. After over a decade passed without the

145. BAZAN, supra note 50, at 4 (quoting statements of the Conference Committee
contained within H. REP. NO. 97-580, at 7-8 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 170, 171-72) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See supra Part I.B.
147. See supra Part II.
148. See supra Part II.B.
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IIPA being used, Congress, in 1999, confirmed that it had not
forgotten about the obscure law. Realizing that the scope of those
protected needed to be expanded, Congress amended the IIPA to
allow for the protection of retired case officers.149 Because of this
amendment, it is generally illegal to expose a retired case officer
whose identity remains classified and who has served outside of the
United States within the prior five years,150 provided that the other
statutory elements common to any IIPA offense are present.151
Although this amendment was an improvement to the IIPA, it was
not expansive enough.
The most exacting language restricting the class of protected
persons is the statutory definition of a “covert agent.” This definition
excludes from protection any current or former case officer that has
not served clandestinely outside of the United States within five
years of the exposure.152 Five years is simply an arbitrary period
imposed by legislators.153 In place of this arbitrary five-year period,
case officers’ identities should be protected indefinitely.154 Indefinite
protection will permit exposure of a case officer’s identity in instances only when the IIPA’s statutory defenses apply (including
self-identification by the officer),155 the government is not taking
“affirmative measures” to conceal the officer’s identity,156 or the
officer’s identity is declassified.157
There are three justifications for indefinite protection. First, the
continued protection of a case officer’s identity is a matter that
deserves an informed determination by the respective intelligence
149. See INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-457,
at 6, 37 (1999) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 304, 308.
150. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 426(4)(A) (2006).
151. See discussion supra Part I.C.
152. See 50 U.S.C. § 426(4)(A)(ii).
153. According to Victoria Toensing, the former chief counsel to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence who assisted in drafting the IIPA, a time frame from one year to
ten years was discussed. See Examining the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, supra note
131.
154. But see Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 811, 876-79 (2007) (arguing that although the government may occasionally need to
keep information secret for lengthy periods, indefinite secrecy is never warranted).
155. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (providing a short overview of the
defenses and exceptions found within the IIPA).
156. See 50 U.S.C. § 421.
157. See id. § 426(4)(A)(i).
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agency on a case-by-case basis, as compared to an arbitrary blanket
rule applied by a disconnected third party158—in this case, Congress.
Indefinite protection will provide intelligence agencies with the
power, through the declassification process, to make the critical
decision of when a case officer’s identity no longer necessitates
protection rather than placing that authority with the legislature.
Second, indefinite protection is supported by the assertion that
exposing case officers’ identities serves no legitimate public purpose.159 Unlike law enforcement officers, who differ emphatically
from intelligence operatives, there is no need for case officers’
identities to be exposed for purposes of due process.160 Furthermore,
exercises in government oversight are equally successful when case
officers’ identities are not exposed.161 Third, the IIPA, inexplicably,
already provides indefinite protection for all assets but not all case
officers. According to the IIPA, the identity of any foreign national
who is or has served as an agent, informant, or source to an
intelligence agency, provided that the connection to the United
States is classified, will be protected for as long as that relationship
remains classified.162 Because Congress has deemed it necessary to
protect foreign nationals, it is imperative that their case officer
counterparts are granted equal treatment. For these reasons, the
identities of case officers must be protected indefinitely, without
artificial limitations on disclosure.
Providing a framework for indefinite protection will also bring
many advantages to both case officers and the intelligence community, thereby enhancing the usefulness of HUMINT. First, indefinite
protection will strengthen protection of the intelligence networks
that case officers establish abroad. These networks include case
158. Cf. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (“We seriously doubt whether a potential
intelligence source will rest assured knowing that judges, who have little or no background
in the delicate business of intelligence gathering, will order his identity revealed.”).
159. See Bivins, supra note 25, at 859-60.
160. Law enforcement officers’ duties differ drastically from those of intelligence operatives,
in that law enforcement officers are directly involved in the criminal justice process. Law
enforcement officers, for example, have arrest powers and often testify at trial, requiring them
to be present and identifiable. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Conversely, there is no such
requirement for intelligence operatives who simply gather information.
161. See discussion supra Part III.A.
162. 50 U.S.C. § 426(4)(C). These intelligence relationships typically remain classified for
an extensive period.
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officers’ fellow colleagues and assets.163 Such connections and
relationships do not terminate after a five-year period; instead, they
last for the lifetimes of the individuals involved.164 No matter if an
unauthorized disclosure of a case officer’s identity occurs either five
years or fifteen years following that officer’s clandestine service
abroad, there is always the possibility that foreign governments can
reconstruct the actions, contacts, and affiliations of the exposed
officer.165 Second, indefinite protection will instill current and
potential assets with increased confidence that the identities of the
case officers with whom they interact will remain secret. This added
security will lead to a greater flow of information from a larger
number of assets. Third, the integrity of the covert operations with
which departing case officers were involved will remain intact. Not
only will the established networks of those operations continue
undamaged, but also CIA front organizations166 and companies167
integral to those operations will not be compromised as a consequence of a case officer’s exposure following five years of inactive
clandestine service abroad. Finally, indefinite protection will remove
unneeded restrictions on both intelligence agencies’ personnel
management and the personal career choices of case officers.
Exposure of a case officer’s identity typically destroys any future
possibility for that officer to serve clandestinely.168 For this reason,
under the current framework, if a case officer rotates out of the
clandestine service for more than five years, then that officer should

163. See supra notes 5-7, 13 and accompanying text.
164. One military media analyst insists, “Clandestine intelligence officers and their
recruited assets need protection virtually the rest of their lives.” Posting of Lt. Col. Rick
Francona to Hardblogger, http://hardblogger.msnbc.msn.com/Archive/2007/03/06/81133.aspx
(Mar. 6, 2007, 14:50 EST) (arguing that the five-year protection period in the IIPA is an
arbitrary time frame).
165. See Walter Pincus & Mike Allen, Leak of Agent’s Name Causes Exposure of CIA Front
Firm, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2003, at A3 (“A former diplomat ... said ... that every foreign
intelligence service would run Plame’s name through its databases within hours of its
publication to determine if she had visited their country and to reconstruct her activities.”).
166. Those organizations include ones such as the AIFLD in Nicaragua. See supra note 42
and accompanying text.
167. These companies include the former Brewster Jennings & Associates of the Plame
affair. See Pincus & Allen, supra note 165 (explaining that the disclosure of Plame’s identity
revealed that Brewster Jennings & Associates was a CIA front company for which Plame
purportedly worked).
168. Francis, supra note 35, at 3.
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be restricted from returning to clandestine service abroad.169 By
removing these restrictions on rotation, the confusion regarding
whether an intelligence professional is statutorily defined as a
“covert agent” will be avoided. For instance, if indefinite protection
was provided during the Plame affair, then there would have been
few questions as to whether Plame qualified as a statutorily
protected individual, even with her sporadic and questionably
clandestine assignments abroad.170 Easily resolving this question
would have relaxed the burdensome evidentiary requirements that
prevented Fitzgerald from pursuing IIPA charges, as the prosecution would have needed to show only that Plame, at any point, was
a case officer, her identity remained classified information, and
there were “affirmative measures” taken to protect her identity.171
Lessening the evidentiary requirements by simplifying the definition of statutorily protected persons will assist prosecutors in
clearly identifying instances when the IIPA has been violated.
Furthermore, implementing indefinite protection will eradicate the
ambiguities in applying the “covert agent” definition, thereby appropriately shifting the burden of making the delicate interpretation of
the term “covert agent” away from the judiciary when the courts
finally have the opportunity to comment on the IIPA.
The justifications for and results of a framework for indefinite
protection make it clear that an amendment is essential and long

169. Whether the intelligence community maintains internal policies preventing this type
of situation is unknown. Nevertheless, it is imprudent for an intelligence agency to allow a
former case officer to recommit to the clandestine service following more than five years of
inactive clandestine service abroad because that officer’s identity, under the current law,
could have been legally disclosed in the interim. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of
1982, 50 U.S.C. § 426(4)(A) (2006). Given the ever-increasing capability of communication
technology, it is impossible for the intelligence community to be cognizant of or monitor every
publication regarding the identification of its current and former case officers during periods
when they are not considered “covert agents.” Allowing an employee to reenter the clandestine
service under such circumstances will not only endanger that officer but also those associated
with him or her. See supra notes 10, 13 and accompanying text. The potential calamity of the
consequences, therefore, is equal to that as if the case officer’s identity is illegally exposed.
170. See discussion supra Part II.B.
171. Although this proposal does not address the ambiguity surrounding the standard for
evaluating “affirmative measures,” it increases the likelihood of the IIPA’s application by
expanding the class of protected persons, which would finally allow the courts to address the
definition of “affirmative measures.” In cases in which the standard is disputed, defining
“affirmative measures” is a matter upon which the judiciary should expound.
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overdue. Eliminating the arbitrary five-year component within
the “covert agent” definition will expand protection to numerous,
deserving current and former case officers. Moreover, a framework
for indefinite protection of case officers’ identities will serve the
interests of the intelligence community by strengthening HUMINT,
allowing greater application of the IIPA, and assisting in eradicating one of the IIPA’s inherent limitations that became evident
during the Plame affair.
2. Easing the Narrowness of Its Offenses
Another priority of an IIPA amendment must be easing the
narrowness of its offenses. This narrowness has contributed to its
lack of application in many instances.172 The elements comprising
an IIPA offense are so restrictive that prosecuting individuals under
the statute becomes exceedingly difficult.173 There is a joint solution
to this issue, which will disturb neither the IIPA’s intended purpose
nor its constitutionality.
a. Replacing the “Knowledge” Element
First, the IIPA must be amended to replace the “knowledge”
element for those offenses relating to disclosures by government
officials or personnel. As the offenses under § 421(a) and § 421(b)
currently read, government “insiders” prosecuted under the IIPA
must possess knowledge both “that the information disclosed so
identifies [a] covert agent and that the United States is taking
affirmative measures to conceal [that] covert agent’s intelligence
relationship to the United States.”174 This element is simply too
demanding. In place of the “knowledge” element, a “reason to
believe” standard should be substituted.
The current “knowledge” element places an excessive burden on
the government when prosecuting “insiders” under the IIPA. As
exemplified by the Plame affair, the prosecution was hesitant to use

172. See supra Part II.B.
173. See discussion supra Part II.B.
174. Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)-(b) (2006).
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the IIPA due to skepticism that it could prove that there was
requisite knowledge.175 Fitzgerald had to prove first that Libby, or
anyone else involved in the leak, knew that Plame was indeed
“covert.”176 Even if Fitzgerald could have proven knowledge of
Plame’s “covert” status, the prosecution then had to demonstrate
that Libby, or the others involved in the leak, knew that the
government was taking “affirmative measures” to conceal her
identity.177 These became impossible tasks for the prosecution.178
By retaining the “knowledge” element, a claim of ignorance
becomes a guilty defendant’s best defense. A defendant can simply
claim that he or she lacked positive knowledge that the disclosure
identified a “covert agent” or that the United States was taking
“affirmative measures” to conceal the exposed “covert agent’s”
identity. The difficulty in establishing knowledge is exacerbated by
the ambiguity surrounding the terms “covert agent” and “affirmative measures.”179 Therefore, when claiming an ignorance defense,
a culpable defendant may not even have to resort to dishonesty,
because these terms are so convoluted that, in many situations, it
is plausible that the ambiguity of the terms will prevent the
defendant from possessing actual knowledge. Without demonstration of the requisite knowledge, an otherwise culpable defendant
must be acquitted. To counter a claim of ignorance, the prosecution
is left to rely upon only circumstantial evidence, as the existence of
mere constructive knowledge must be evaluated using the defendant’s public and private statements and any information available
to and accessed by the defendant. Such evidence, however, is not
easily discernible. Additionally, the government may have to go as
far as proving motive to convince the fact-finder that the defendant
had positive knowledge regarding the substance of the information
disclosed. Given the gravity of the offense, this is an overly demanding standard for the government to meet, and it provides defendants
with a simple escape route to bypass conviction.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
See 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)-(b).
See id.
See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 98.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-14.
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Further supporting the replacement of the “knowledge” element
is that it is nearly impossible to demonstrate knowledge under a
§ 421(b) offense. This subsection addresses disclosures by government “insiders” who have access to classified information, but who
are not cleared to access materials that directly identify case
officers.180 When a § 421(b) offense occurs, the identity of a case
officer is typically inferred from an individual’s access to other
classified material.181 Provided this inference, these government
“insiders” will almost never possess positive knowledge that the
identified case officer qualifies as a “covert agent.”182 Information
pertinent to proving knowledge, including details of a case officer’s
assignments or a timeline of an officer’s operational history, will not
be directly accessible by this class of government “insiders.”183 As a
result, proving the “knowledge” element in a § 421(b) offense is rare.
In place of the “knowledge” element, a less demanding “reason to
believe” standard should be implemented. Replacing the “knowledge” element with a “reason to believe” standard will remove
barriers to IIPA prosecutions and create realistic objectives for
related criminal investigations. Under such a standard, prosecutors
will have to prove that a reasonable person under the circumstances
would have known that the disclosed information identified a
“covert agent” and that the government was taking “affirmative
measures” to conceal that identity.
There are three reasons why the “reason to believe” standard
should prevail. First, the “reason to believe” standard is particularly
well-suited for its application to government “insiders.” Simply by
working within the public sector and having interaction and
familiarity with the intelligence apparatus, government “insiders”
are innately aware of the sensitivity of the information they
handle.184 Consequently, before a government “insider” intentionally
discloses potentially sensitive information, that individual is

180. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
181. Francis, supra note 35, at 3-4.
182. See id. at 3 (stating that those with positive knowledge are principally case officers
who have the ability to expose their colleagues).
183. See id. at 2 (explaining the most common ways individuals gain access to classified
information).
184. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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already on notice of the possible illegality of his or her actions.185
This also holds true for the class of government “insiders” that
§ 421(b) addresses. Because the information from which these
government “insiders” make an inference is classified, and because
they are not cleared to access directly the sensitive material verifying their inference, these “insiders” must presume that disclosing
this inference will be unlawful.186 Substituting a “reason to believe”
standard, therefore, will increase prudence when handling classified
information, as reckless behavior will be punished. Government
“insiders” will no longer be able to disregard their increased
awareness for the sensitivity of the classified information they
handle, thus resulting in fewer leaks. Second, Congress has already
taken into account the heightened culpability of government
“insiders” by subjecting them to more severe criminal penalties.187
Such heightened culpability is correlative to an “insider’s” increased
awareness of the sensitivity of the classified information that was
compromised.188 Third, implementing the “reason to believe” standard under § 421(a) and § 421(b) is constitutionally sound,189
especially given that the subsections do not apply to “outsiders.”
The “reason to believe” standard is already present in a § 421(c)

185. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1083 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (finding unpersuasive the defendant’s claim that he was not on notice that his
misuse of classified information may lead to prosecution, given that he was a trained
government officer with a security clearance).
186. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
187. Compare Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421(a)-(b) (2006),
with id. § 421(c) (displaying that the severity of criminal penalties in each subsection
decreases significantly when the perpetrator’s access to the classified information containing
the identities of case officers and awareness of the sensitivity of that material is reduced).
188. See supra notes 18, 179-80 and accompanying text.
189. Francis, supra note 35, at 9 (citing United States v. Bishop, 555 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.
1977); Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1944)) (explaining that the “reason
to believe” standard has been upheld by courts against claims that it is unconstitutionally
vague); see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1980) (holding that, even in the
absence of an express secrecy agreement, the government may act to protect substantial
government interests, such as the identities of case officers, by imposing reasonable
restrictions on current or former employees’ activities that may, in other contexts, be
protected by the First Amendment).
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offense190 and other espionage-related statutes.191 This signifies that
Congress is not opposed to lessening the standard.
By eliminating the “knowledge” element and substituting a
“reason to believe” standard in § 421(a) and § 421(b), the IIPA will
finally have complete authority to punish unauthorized disclosures
by government “insiders” and hold a particular class of perpetrators
responsible for their actions that, otherwise, go unpunished under
the current framework. This will allow the IIPA to stop leaks at
their source—government “insiders.” Through the increased enforcement of leaks by “insiders,” fewer unauthorized disclosures will
make their way outside of the government. This reduction in
unauthorized disclosures will compensate for the IIPA’s inability,
for constitutional reasons, to monitor “outsiders” as closely as it does
government “insiders.”192
b. Eliminating the “Pattern of Activities” Element
Second, abolishing the “pattern of activities” element of § 421(c)193
will alleviate the narrowness of the IIPA. Requiring a “pattern of
activities” allows certain deliberate and malicious unauthorized
disclosures of case officers’ identities to go unpunished.194 This
element, therefore, must be stricken from § 421(c).
The “pattern of activities” element places too many unauthorized
disclosures of case officers’ identities outside of the purview of the
IIPA.195 Under the current language, a single, isolated unauthorized
disclosure by an “outsider” will go unpunished even though that
individual knows that the information he or she reveals identifies
a “covert agent” and the United States is taking “affirmative
measures” to conceal that identity.196 The IIPA defines a “pattern of

190. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c) (“Whoever ... intended to identify and expose ... with reason to
believe that such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States.” (emphasis added)).
191. Francis, supra note 35, at 9; see, e.g., Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 783(a)
(2006).
192. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
193. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
194. See Bruce, supra note 116, at 47.
195. Id.
196. See Ferguson, supra note 53, at 488-89.
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activities” as a “series of acts with a common purpose or objective.”197 Therefore, once an unauthorized disclosure of a case
officer’s identity occurs, prosecutors must wait for evidence of
multiple acts by the “outsider,” all of which must relate to the
unauthorized disclosure, before they can pursue IIPA charges. A
single disclosure, unrelated to any pattern, however, can be calamitous in itself.198 If classified information is in the wrong hands,
then requiring the occurrence of numerous acts allows for the
exposure of additional case officers’ identities before law enforcement officials can intervene. Furthermore, the amount of harm that
an “outsider” can cause during the course of an investigation to
uncover a “pattern of activities” surrounding that individual’s initial
exposure may be catastrophic.199 If several individuals or means of
publication are involved, the time it takes for investigators to
discover that numerous acts or disclosures are associated with an
initial unauthorized disclosure could render the IIPA impotent.
Given recent advancements in communication technologies, investigators, in many situations, may never be able to discover and link
numerous acts or disclosures together. For these reasons, the
“pattern of activities” element must be eliminated.
Although striking the “pattern of activities” element will enable
more prosecutions, this change will neither chill the rights and
freedoms of “outsiders” nor discourage their lawful activity.
Prosecutors still must prove four key elements. First, the government must show that there was an intent “to identify and expose
covert agents.”200 Second, the government must demonstrate that
the “outsider” had a reasonable belief that his or her actions “would
impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States.”201 Third, the government must display that the “outsider”
knew the disclosed information identified a “covert agent.”202
Fourth, the government must prove that the “outsider” knew that

197. 50 U.S.C. § 426(10).
198. See Bruce, supra note 116, at 47.
199. See id.
200. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
201. Id.
202. Id. This is in contrast to the “reason to believe” standard proposed for the prosecution
of “insiders” under § 421(a) and § 421(b). See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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the U.S. government was “taking affirmative measures to conceal”
that identity.203 As displayed in cases involving government “insiders,” proving the “knowledge” element can be nearly impossible.204
When applied to “outsiders,” this evidentiary burden is increased
considerably, as information pertinent to proving knowledge will
never be directly available to any “outsider.”205 For these reasons,
the government is currently prevented from charging “outsiders”
under the IIPA for any or every unauthorized disclosure.
Abolishing the “pattern of activities” requirement will expand the
IIPA’s application and enable it to be utilized swiftly, thereby
restricting the number and effect of unauthorized disclosures of case
officers’ identities. Allowing for such an amendment will effectuate
these positive results without senselessly restricting the activities
of the media and other “outsiders.” Together, deleting the “pattern
of activities” element and replacing the “knowledge” element with
a “reason to believe” standard will serve to ease the narrowness of
the IIPA, which will facilitate its enforcement and allow the IIPA to
fulfill its purpose of protecting case officers’ identities regardless of
the source or means of disclosure.
C. Addressing the Other Factors
Properly amending the IIPA by expanding the class of protected
persons and easing the narrowness of its offenses addresses only
one factor, albeit the most significant factor, contributing to its
limited application. As compared to the external measures that can
resolve the IIPA’s inherent limitations, addressing the two other
factors—the availability of the Espionage Act206 and a lack of political initiative in enforcing the IIPA207—is possible from only internal
advancements within the executive branch.

203. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c).
204. This is especially true in § 421(b) offenses. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
205. Such information includes details of a case officer’s assignments and/or timeline of
operational history. See supra text accompanying note 182.
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. See supra Part II.C.
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With regard to the availability of the Espionage Act, it is
clear that there will be a natural limitation on the IIPA’s use.208
Prosecutors, however, must realize that a revamped IIPA can serve
as a valuable lesser-included offense to espionage, when applicable.
For example, the IIPA can be particularly useful in plea-bargaining
situations or when charges of espionage are weak. Under the proper
circumstances, simply charging perpetrators with IIPA offenses will
alert the public to this law, allowing it to become a deterrent to the
unauthorized disclosure of case officers’ identities.
Conversely, addressing the lack of political initiative in enforcing
the IIPA requires discussion of three issues: (1) concerns regarding
the IIPA’s constitutionality, (2) fear that pursuing IIPA charges will
lead to the disclosure of further classified information during trial,
and (3) the desire to use unauthorized disclosures as a means of
influencing policy.209 First, prosecutors must not let potential
concerns regarding the IIPA’s constitutionality deter its use. This
Note does not seek to provide a comprehensive discussion of the
IIPA’s constitutionality, as previous articles have already done so.210
Until the courts are afforded an opportunity to comment on the
IIPA, there is nothing further to discuss on the subject. From a
cursory perspective, however, prosecutors must not let this issue
control their decisions to use the IIPA. Given its meticulous drafting
and the lengthy discussion over its language, both of which are
documented in its legislative history,211 it must be presumed that
the IIPA is constitutionally sound. One of the legal scholars summoned to comment on the IIPA was then professor and current U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin G. Scalia.212 At the time, Justice
208. See supra Part II.A.
209. See supra Part II.C.
210. See sources cited supra note 121.
211. Debate over such a measure lasted for more than five years with fifteen bills drafted
over that period. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Numerous interest groups
participated in congressional testimony concerning the final bill, including the Society of
Professional Journalists, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Bar
Association Committee on Freedom of Expression. See Ferguson, supra note 53, at 484-85.
Following these comments and lengthy debate, Congress felt so confident about the soundness
of the measure that it overwhelmingly approved the bill. See supra notes 54, 122 and
accompanying text.
212. See Thomas S. Blanton, Op-Ed., Keeping Secrets at Too High a Price, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
22, 2001, at A19.
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Scalia concluded, “‘the necessity of this particular, narrow category
of disclosure to the free and open political debate which the [F]irst
[A]mendment is intended primarily to assure’ is ‘negligible.’”213
Supporting Justice Scalia’s analysis are several legal decisions,
which have restricted individuals’ ability to disseminate information
and deferred to the executive branch’s measures to maintain secrecy
when the information involves issues of national security.214
Moreover, the constitutionality issue confronts only § 421(c) offenses
involving “outsiders,” not § 421(a) or § 421(b) offenses covering government “insiders.”215 Concerns about constitutionality, therefore,
should not be a factor in enforcing the IIPA against government
officials or personnel. Continued inaction due to constitutional
concerns makes the IIPA no more effective than if it did not exist at
all. Second, government officials must continue to carefully calculate the risk that further classified information could be disclosed
during an IIPA trial.216 When doing so, however, both prosecutors
and the affected agency must jointly conduct a cost-benefit analysis,
with the possibility of further disclosures not being the sole
determinant in enforcing the IIPA.217 Congress has reiterated that,
in most circumstances, the CIPA will be effective in lessening the

213. Id.
214. See generally, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (upholding the DCI’s refusal to
allow disclosure of records containing intelligence sources); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981)
(holding that unauthorized disclosures of classified information, specifically case officers’
identities, are not protected by the Constitution, even if those exposures are part of a larger
critique of the government); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that
intelligence agencies can act to protect the secrecy of national security information and the
appearance of constitutionality by imposing reasonable restrictions on employees’ activities
that in other contexts may be protected by the First Amendment); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that the freedoms of speech and press are not absolute, as the
government may restrict publication of information relating to the number and location of
troops); United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the First
Amendment does not prohibit prosecutions for unauthorized leaks of damaging national
security information); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the
legislative and executive branches have discretion, nonreviewable by the judiciary, to require
secrecy regulations involving restricting the dispersal of classified information).
215. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28.
217. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997, H.R. REP. NO. 104-832, at
35 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3996, 4000.
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risks of a trial.218 Third, the desire to use unauthorized disclosures
as a means of influencing policy will dissipate if the IIPA is properly
amended. With a stronger law in place, the executive branch will no
longer have an excuse for failing to monitor itself. Political pressure
to enforce a viable and effective IIPA will eventually lead to fewer
exposures of case officers’ identities. Although the lack of political
initiative in enforcing the IIPA can be rectified, it requires the
executive branch to take the initiative to address each of these three
issues influencing its behavior.
CONCLUSION
The intended purpose of the IIPA is commendable; yet its
application and enforcement have been disappointing. For over
twenty-five years, the IIPA has been disguised as an important
safety mechanism for the protection of case officers’ identities. Its
existence, however, has been marked by ineffectiveness. Since its
inception in 1982, the IIPA has been enforced only once, while going
overlooked in numerous instances when case officers’ identities were
unlawfully exposed. Unless the IIPA is significantly amended now,
it risks becoming obsolete.
Although the IIPA has been a disappointment to the intelligence
community, it remains a necessary protective device in preventing
unauthorized disclosures of the most sensitive classified information—case officers’ identities. Upon discovering the three factors
contributing to its limited application, it is clear that the IIPA must
be amended in order to serve its intended purpose and ensure its
vitality. Lessons from the Plame affair indicate that an IIPA amendment must address two primary issues—expanding the class of
protected persons and easing the narrowness of its offenses. By
properly amending the IIPA, its inherent limitations can be resolved. This added strength will allow it to overcome the remaining
two factors limiting its application, thus creating a valuable tool for
law enforcement.

218. See id. But see Bruce, supra note 116, at 47 (arguing that better protection is needed
than presently afforded by the CIPA).

2312

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:2269

The IIPA must become an attractive option for prosecutors so that
it can punish and deter deplorable activity. The men and women
who place their lives in daily peril while serving their country
abroad deserve sincere advocates at home who are willing to provide
them with adequate protection. If these critical amendments are
implemented, then the IIPA can finally achieve its potential and
fulfill the aspirations of its creators and those it is intended to
protect.
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